Towards identifying salient patterns in genetic programming individuals

This thesis addresses the problem of offline identification of salient patterns in genetic programming individuals. It discusses the main issues related to automatic pattern identification systems, namely that these (a) should help in understanding the final solutions of the evolutionary run, (b) should give insight into the course of evolution and (c) should be helpful in optimizing future runs. Moreover, it proposes an algorithm, Extended Pattern Growing Algorithm ([E]PGA) to extract, filter and sort the identified patterns so that these fulfill as many as possible of the following criteria: (a) they are representative for the evolutionary run and/or search space, (b) they are human-friendly and (c) their numbers are within reasonable limits. The results are demonstrated on six problems from different domains

A magyar sajtófőnök "tudtával és segítségével”: Háborús portrévázlat kérdőjelekkel – Ullein-Reviczky Antal (1942-1944) = "With the knowledge and help" of the Hungarian press chief: a wartime portrait with question marks - Antal Ullein-Reviczky (1942-1944)

Antal Ullein-Reviczky, highly intellectual, witty and assertive, remains one of the most interesting and dynamic fi gures in the history of Hungary’s eff orts to leave the German orbit during the fateful years of the Second World War. He seems to be, at the same time, one of the controversial characters among Hungarian diplomats who were involved in secret negotiations, at least as far as the judgement of some of his contemporaries suggests. For more than a year he was not only Head of the Foreign Ministry Press Department, but also held the position of Press Chief in the Premier’s Offi ce. He had a key impact upon the Hungarian Press under two Prime Ministers, László Bárdossy and Miklós Kállay. The latter was said to have relied mainly on Ullein-Reviczky, who had confl icts and a tense relationship with the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry. Kállay gradually turned towards the offi cials of the Political Department. Later, from the autumn of 1943, Ullein-Reviczky, as Hungarian Minister, had a key role in secret talks with the Allies in Stockholm. There were numerous eff orts to engage in secret negotiations with allied representatives, and early 1944 he encouraged his superiors in Budapest to take the initiative and direct peace-feelers towards the Soviet Union as well. Although a frequent target of criticism, Ullein-Reviczky had great merits, took some brave initiative, and in journalists he left behind good memories, having been a tactful and benevolent ‘censor’ who applied persuasion instead of oppression

Helyzetmérlegelés és taktika a magyar háborús diplomáciában, 1942-1944

In 1942 Miklós Kállay accepted Premiership after Regent Horthy had managed to convince him following a series of discussions. They shared the same views concerning the possible outcome of the war, although Kállay seemed more pessimistic at the beginning. Both had the strong belief that the Anglo-American alliance would emerge as the strongest centre of power at the war’s end, thus in a position to determine the fate of Hungary, and the traditional balance of power politics of the British would not be altered significantly. Kállay lacked stable domestic support for his policies, as pro-German political forces remained strong. Hungarian foreign policy decision-makers relied mainly on their experience of the First World War, which ultimately proved to be little help when critical moments were already near. Few of them reckoned with the desperate resistance of Germany until the bitter end. The military balance had changed radically by the end of January 1943, which lead to the final consolidation of the antagonistic cooperation of the Soviets and the West. For Hungary it was very difficult to accept the serious consequences and face the necessary, but least of all desired conclusions. More than only in theory, Kállay and the Hungarian Foreign Ministry officials still saw some avenues open to defect from the German camp successfully, preserving even the territorial gains. The key problem remained, however, to forecast the so-called ‘zero hour’ when careful timing and the acceptance of risk could guarantee success even at Hitler’s doorstep

Gömbös Gyula politikai pályaképe (könyvismertető)

A recenzált mű: Gergely Jenő: Gömbös Gyula. Politikai pályakép. Vince Kiadó, Budapest, 2001. 352 p